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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TYLER BOYCE, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
vs. 
TAMMY L. GOBLE, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
Case No. 990641-CA 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal from a final order modifying child support in the 
Second District Court , Davis County, Utah. Jurisdiction is based upon 
§78-2a-3 (2)(h) of the Utah Code. There have been no prior appeals. 
Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review 
This appeal involves the assertions of the Respondent-Appellant 
("mother") that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying child 
support obligations based upon a cursory finding that a minor change in 
the visitation schedule constituted a substantial change in circumstances, 
This issues was preserved for appeal at the trial on the Petition for 
Modification (R. 448, pp. 46-47), by her Motion for Reconsideration (R. 
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175-178), and in the argument of her attorney at the hearing on that 
motion (R. 235). The issues are stated as follows: 
(1) In view of the statutory and case law requirement that child 
support orders can be modified only if the circumstances have 
substantially changed, was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
find that a minor modification of the visitation schedule constituted a 
substantial change in circumstances justifying a change in the child 
support order? A court 's legal conclusion as whether a material change 
in circumstances has occurred is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sigg 
v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995). Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 43ly 437 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P. 2d 438\ 442 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). 
(2) In view of the statutory and case law requirement that child 
support orders can be modified only if the circumstances have 
substantially changed, was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
enter an order of modification based upon cursory findings of changed 
circumstances? The determination of whether there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Moonv.Moon. 973P.2d431} 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); 
Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P. 2d 438y 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Determinative Statutes 
Sections 30-3-10.4, 78-2a-3 (2)(h), and 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code 
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Annotated, are determinative of, or of central importance to, this 
appeal, and are in Appendix A of the addendum to this brief. 
Statement of the Case 
(a) The Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a final order by the Second District Court , 
Farmington Department, Davis County, Utah, in case number 
964701453, modifying the original child support order entered less than 
three years earlier. 
(b) The Course of Proceedings 
On November 25, 1996, the mother and father were divorced by a 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 46-52). Less than a year later, on 
August 4, 1997, the father filed a Verified Petition for Modification (R. 
70-75), seeking to change both visitation and child support . The mother 
counter-petitioned on the issue of visitation only, also on the basis 
that the order was unworkable (R. 399). Trial was held July 13, 1998. 
The Court afterward signed the Respondent 's Proposed Order of 
Modification (R. 227-230), continuing the previous joint custody 
arrangement but with a more specific visitation schedule. However, the 
court also lowered the father's child support obligation. The mother 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial (R. 175-178), which was 
denied (R. 399-401). A Notice of Appeal was filed (R. 411-412). 
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(c) Statement of Relevant Facts 
On November 25, 1996, the mother and father were divorced by a 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce in the Second District Court (R. 46-52). 
The decree made provisions for the joint custody of the children and 
liberal visitation by the father (R. 46-47) and the child support 
obligations of the father (R. 47). 
Nine months later, on August 4, 1997, the father filed a Verified 
Petition for Modification of the decree (R. 70-75), asking to change both 
visitation and child support. The mother counter-petit ioned on the 
issue of visitation only, also on the basis that the order was 
unworkable (R. 399). Trial was held July 13, 1998 (R. 448). The trial 
court changed the visitation schedule in a minor way, and on the 
basis that this visitation change constituted a substantial change of 
circumstances, also reduced child support obligations of the father from 
$796 in the original Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 796, paragraph 
3) to $593 in the Order of Modification (R. 228, paragraph 2). 
The court stated the legal grounds for this change as follows: 
(a) in its oral ruling at the time of the trial on July 13, 1998: 
"The Court would find that the mediated agreement is 
consistent with the original decree of joint custody and joint 
Fphysical custody, defining the overnight visitation, what iberal visitation meant 
"The Court would find based on the mediation, based 
on the time, that this is a joint custody arrangement, a 
joint physical, shared arrangement. Mrs. Goble testified that 
the plaintiff, Mr. Boyce, would have similar expenses to her 
-4-
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for the overn igh t v i s i t a t ions in th i s . 
"The Court would find that that would represent a 
substantial change of circumstances, particularly the mediated 
agreement in which they've agreed on specific times, and that this 
should be determined under a joint worksheet for determining 
child support." [Emphasis added.] (R. 448, pp . 49-50) 
(b) in its O r d e r of Modif ica t ion: 
1. The par t ies will con t inue to share jo in t legal and 
physical cus tody of the i r th ree mino r ch i ld ren . P e t i t i o n e r 
is awarded the fol lowing specific v i s i t a t ion schedule 
2. The above-referenced time sharing represents Petitioner 
having37% ofthe nights and Respondent having63% of the nights 
and these percentages will be used in a joint custody worksheet 
format to calculate child support. [Emphasis added.] (R. 228) 
(c) in its O r d e r on Mot ion for Recons ide ra t ion or N e w Tr ia l : 
2. The C o u r t finds tha t at the t ime of t r ia l here in Ju ly 
31 , 1998, the C o u r t heard evidence tha t the par t ies agreed in 
the i r or ig inal d ivorce s t ipu la t ion to jo in t legal and jo in t 
physical cus tody of the i r m ino r ch i ldren and l i t e r a l 
v i s i t a t ion . The C o u r t found tha t since en t ry of the Decree 
the re have been subs tan t ia l , mater ia l changes in c i rcum-
stances whe re in the par t ies were unable to agree on a 
v i s i t a t ion schedule and tha t bo th par t ies filed pe t i t i ons to 
modify s ta t ing tha t the jo in t cus tody te rms of the Decree were 
u n w o r k a b l e . At t r i a l , the C o u r t found tha t the par t ies had 
resolved many d i spu tes . . . inc lud ing having agreed to continue 
the joint legal and joint physical custody of t he i r ch i ld ren and 
having agreed on a v i s i t a t ion schedule award ing to 
P la in t i f f . . .37% of the t ime wi th the ch i ld ren , and Defendant 
having 63% of the t ime wi th the ch i ld ren . Based on the new 
visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, the C o u r t 
deemed it app rop r i a t e tha t the par t ies use a jo in t physica l 
cus tody workshee t to calculate the amoun t of fu ture chi ld 
suppo r t . [Emphasis added.] (R. 399-400) 
Summary of A r g u m e n t s on Appeal 
1. Even t h o u g h conta ined w i t h i n a s ing le decree , 
chi ld support orders and chi ld custody orders are separate 
and d i s t inc t i s sues , each o r i g i n a t i n g from di f ferent legal 
sources w i t h separate requirements for m o d i f i c a t i o n . 
-5-
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It is the common practice in Utah that divorce decrees roll child 
support orders, child custody arrangements, alimony awards, property 
divisions and other issues into a single decree. This is only practical. 
Nevertheless, this grouping into a single order does not detract from the 
separate legal standards which apply to each of those areas. The law of 
child support is governed by §§78-45-2 through 78-45-9, the standards for 
child custody are found in §§30-3-10 through 30-3-10.6,and the legal 
basis of alimony is set out in §§30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9). Each of these 
areas has its own requirements and considerations which must be 
followed by the trial court. 
2. A legal basis for modifying an existing decree 
must be shown in each area to be modified, and a legal 
basis in only one area does not open up the entire decree to 
modification. 
The statutory requirements established by the Utah Legislature 
obviously contemplated that the legal criteria for modification must be 
shown in each individual area to be modified. A material change on one 
issue does not open up the entire decree to wholesale modification. 
This intent is demonstrated by the different statutes governing 
modification. For example, in child custody situations, §30-3-10.4(l)(a) 
states that "the court may...modify an order that established joint legal 
custody if: .. .the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under 
the circumstances." However, an unworkable custody order is not listed 
in §78-45-7.2 as one of the grounds justifying modification of a child 
-6-
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support order. The trial court must find a legal ground relating to each 
issue for which modification is ordered. 
3. Child support law is governed by the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act (§78-45-2 et seq), and 
modification within three years of the original decree 
requires a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. 
When "a child support order has been issued within the previous 
three years, under §78-45-7.2(7) (a) there must be "a substantial change in 
circumstances." §78-45-7.2(7)(b) gives six items constituting a sub-
stantial change in circumstances. 
4. The merits of how to modify the child support 
order of a divorce decree are not reached until the 
threshold requirement of a material and substantial 
change in circumstances have been met. If that threshold 
is not met, the merits are never considered. 
In the child support modification case oiDurfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 
713, 716, (Utah App. 1990), it was held, "On a petit ion for a modification 
of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of 
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the 
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." 
The meaning of the term "threshold requirement" is that no other 
issue of a case is considered until that requirement is met. This is 
clearly shown in the divorce case of Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 250, 
(Utah App. 1987), when in the context of collateral estoppel the Court 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated, "Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach the merits of 
appellant's other points on appeal." 
5, It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
find that a minor change in visitation constituted 
grounds for modifying child support. 
Finding that the visitation order was unworkable and in need of 
modification, the trial court issued an order continuing existing 
custody and modifying visitation by a net 1% of the father's nights 
with the children. The court then simply moved directly to modifying 
child support without any meaningful finding or analysis whatever 
of the threshold requirement under §78-45-7.2(7)(b) of a substantial 
change in circumstances. This 1% visitation change was inconse-
quential, not material. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to use it as a basis for ordering a change in child support . 
6. The trial court's cursory findings of fact are 
insufficient to support the legal conclusion that 
grounds exist for modification of the original child 
support order. 
The findings of fact relied upon by the trial court, as framed by the 
court and quoted in the Statement of Facts, are cursory and legally 
insufficient even if t rue. The trial court 's findings failed to abe 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion of each factual issue was 
reached." Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 739, (Utah App. 1992). See also 
-8-
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Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, (UtahApp. 1999). The trial court 
must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate 
what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the 
modification made in the prior divorce decree constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and reversible error. 
Arguments on Appeal 
1. Even though contained within a single decree, 
child support orders and child custody orders are separate 
and distinct issues, each originating from different legal 
sources with separate requirements for modification. 
It is the common practice in Utah that divorce decrees roll child 
support orders, child custody arrangements, alimony awards, property 
divisions and other issues into a single decree. This is only practical. 
Nevertheless, this grouping into a single order does not detract from the 
separate legal standards which apply to each of those areas. The law of 
child support is governed by §§78-45-2 through 78-45-9, the standards for 
child custody are found in §§30-3-10 through 30-3-10.6, and the legal 
basis of alimony is set out in §§30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9). Each of these 
areas has its own requirements and considerations which must be 
followed by the trial court. 
With respect to child support and child custody, the relevant pro-
visions are quite distinct. Child support law and guidelines are found in 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which is Chapter 45 of Title 
-9-
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78 of the Utah Code. The Utah Legislature gave the issue of child 
support it sown mandates, guidelines and requirements for modification. 
Child custody provisions, however, are found in an entirely 
different part of the Utah Code in Chapter 3 (Divorce) of Title 30 
(Husband and Wife). Again, the Utah Legislature gave the issue of child 
custody its own mandates, guidelines and requirements for modification. 
Had the Legislature wished to do so, it could have grouped child 
support and child custody law into a single act with a single 
standard for modification. But it did not. Rather, legislative intent is 
that the issues are separate with somewhat similar but nonetheless 
differing standards which must be met before modifications can be 
permitted. 
2. A legal basis for modifying an existing decree 
must be shown in each area to be modified, and a legal 
basis in only one area does not open up the entire decree to 
modification. 
The statutory requirements established by the Utah Legislature 
obviously contemplated that the legal criteria for modification must be 
shown in each individual area to be modified. A material change on one 
issue does not open up the entire decree to wholesale modification. 
This intent is demonstrated by the different statutes governing 
modification. For example, in child custody situations, §30-3-10.4(l)(a) 
states that "the court may...modify an order that established joint legal 
custody if: . . .the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under 
-10-
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the c i rcumstances/ However, an unworkable custody order is not 
listed in §78-45-7.2 as one of the grounds justifying modification of a 
child support order. The trial court must find a legal ground relating to 
each issue for which modification is ordered. 
This principle is supported in Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251-
1252, (Utah App. 1989): a[W]hen a substantial change in circumstances is 
shown, it must relate to the basis upon which the original award was 
made by the trial court." This statement was repeated in Muir v. Muir* 
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992). Since the original award was made 
based upon the relevant statutory criteria, the grounds for modification 
must also relate to those same "relevant criteria.* 
This principle was clearly established in the alimony case of 
Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1999), as 
follows: 
Before the trial court can modify a divorce decree, it 
must find that there has been a 'substantial material change of 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." 
UtahCodeAnn.§30-3-5(7)(g)(i)(1998). Once that findinghas 
been made, the court must then consider "at least the 
following factors in determining alimony §30-3-5(7)(a) 
(1998). These factors apply not only to an initial award of 
alimony, but also to a redetermination of alimony during a 
modification proceeding." [Emphasis added.] 
It therefore follows that grounds for a change in alimony do not 
automatically open up a custody order for modification, nor does a 
changein visitation justify a modification of child support . Rather, legal 
ground must be shown in each of the areas of custody and child support, 
-11-
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andin every other individual areafor which modification is requested. 
3. Child support law is governed by the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act (§78-45-2 et seq), and 
modification within three years of the original decree 
requires a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. 
When "a child support order has not been issued or modified 
within the previous three years, under §78-45-7.2(6) a "showing of a 
substantial change in circumstances is not necessary," but when such an 
order has been issued within the previous three years, under §78-45-
7.2(7)(a) there must be "a substantial change in circumstances.* There is 
no other basis for modifying a child support obligation. 
In this case the original Decree of Divorce was entered on 
November 25, 1996, (R. 46-52) and the father's petit ion to modify was 
filed on August 4, 1997,(R. 70-75) which is obviously within three years. 
There must therefore be a showing of "a substantial change in 
circumstances" which "must have occurred since the entry of the decree 
and not contemplated in the decree itself." Pur fee v. Pur fee. 796P.2d713y 
716, (Utah App. 1990). §78-45-7.2(7)(b) gives six items constituting a 
substantial change in circumstances, including '"material changes in 
custody." [Emphasis added.] 
4. The merits of how to modify the child support 
order of a divorce decree are not reached until the 
threshold requirement of a substantial change in 
circumstances have been met. If that threshold is not 
met, the merits are never considered. 
-12-
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In the child support modification case of Durfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 
713, 716, (Utah App. 1990), it was held, "On a petit ion for a modification 
of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of 
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the 
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Citing Durfee. the 
same statement was held applicable in the alimony child case of Moore v. 
Moore. 872 P.2d 1054, 1055, (Utah 1994). The same statement has been 
applied in the child custody case of Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 
footnote 1 at 722, Utah App.1994), and in the property division case oiHill 
v. Hill. 968 P. 2d 866, 869, (Utah App. 1998). The threshold requirement 
applies across the spectrum of divorce decree modification. 
The two-step procedure outlined in the child custody case of Hogge 
v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982), is still good law and is applicable 
In Utah, requests for changes in custody arrangements 
are considered through a bifurcated procedure. The Utah 
Supreme Court requires that the trial court first 'receive 
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any change 
in those circumstances upon which the earlier award of 
custody was based ' During this step, the party seeking 
modification must show: (1) a change of circumstances upon 
which the earlier custody arrangement was based and (2) that 
the changes are sufficiently substantial and material to 
justify reopening the question of custody 
However, where the burden ofproof isnot met, the trial 
court will not reach the second step, the petit ion to modify 
will be denied, and the existing custody award will remain 
unchanged. 
The meaning of the term "threshold requirement" is that no other 
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issue of a case is considered until that requirement is met. This is 
clearly shown in the divorce case of Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 250y 
(Utah App. 1987), when in the context of collateral estoppel the Court 
stated, "Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach the merits of 
appellant's other points on appeal." The same principle was mentioned 
in the divorce case of Toone v. Toone. 952 P. 2d 112, 115, (Utah App. 1998), 
in these words: "Having concluded, as a matter of law, that Parkhurst has 
not shown a change of circumstances as would permit modification 
of the decree, it is unnecessary to consider whether affirmative defenses 
would have been available to bar the petition if Parkhurst had met the 
threshold change-of-circumstances requirement." 
5. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
find that a minor chanee in visitation constituted 
grounds for modifying child support. 
In order for a court to modify an existing child support order of less 
than three years standing it is necessary under §78-45-7.2(a) that there be 
"a substantial change in c i rcumstances/ This is a threshold requirement 
which must be shown prior to proceeding with the merits of how it ought 
to be modified. 
In this case, the findings of the trial court quoted in the Statement 
of Facts show that the court found that the visitation order was 
unworkable and in need of modification. The trial court issued an 
order continuing existing custody and modifying visitation by a net 
-14-
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1% of the father's nights with the children. The court then simply 
moved directly to modifying child support without any meaningful 
finding or analysis whatever of the threshold requirement under 
§78-45-7.2(7)(b) of a substantial change in circumstances. It was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to use the visitation change 
as a basis for ordering a change in child support. 
The trial court itself, as quoted above, stated that the previous 
custody arrangement would not be changed in that "[t]he parties will 
continue to share joint legal and physical custody oftheir three minor 
children." The only change ordered was a specific visitation 
schedule in place of a general one, which was itself extremely minor. It 
changed the father's visitation from 3 8% of nights (R. 448, page 48, lines 
21-22)to 37% of nights (R. 400, quoted above, Order on Modification or 
New Trial, paragraph 2; see also R. 448, page 50, lines 14-16). 
§78-45-7.2(7) (b)(i) provides that "material changes in custody" can 
be a basis for modifying a child support order. However, this order 
continuing existing custody and modifying visitation by a net 1% is 
inconsequential, not material. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to use it as a basis for ordering a change in child support . 
"Abuse of discretion means that the trial court 's ruling is 'beyond 
the limits of reasonabili ty. '" State v. Hamilton. 827P.2d232y 239-40(Utah 
1992). The improper application of the law to a situation is an abuse of 
discretion. Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989). 
-15-
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The trial court failed to clearly delineate bet ween the grounds for 
modifying visitation and for modifying child support . When the 
burden of proof on showing the threshold issue of a change in 
circumstances was not met in the area of child support, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it did not deny the petit ion to modify the 
childsupport . 
6. The trial court's cursory findings of fact are 
insufficient to support the legal conclusion that 
grounds exist for modification of the original child 
support order. 
The reader is invited to go back to the findings of the trial court 
stated in the Statement of Relevant Facts on pages 4 and 5. These cursory 
findings of fact, as framed by the trial court, are legally insufficient even 
if true. Accordingly, the appellant "need not engage in a futile 
marshalling exercise." Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, footnote 
2. (Utah App. 1999). The findings on their face are brief and superficial, 
and utterly fail to disclose either a method of analysis by the trial court 
or a legal basis under §78-45-7.2(7) for finding a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
The Court of Appeals in Williamson noted that "the trial court 
stated that it was 'painting with a broad brush.. . The trial court, 
however, should have substituted a sharpened pencil for its broad brush 
and set forth detailed findings on the factors specif ied. . . / The lower 
court decision was reversed for "insufficiency of the findings below." 
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As in this case now on appeal, the trial court 's finding in 
Williamson failed to "be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion of 
each factual issue was reached.* Muiv v. Muiv. 841 P.2d 736, 739, (Utah 
App. 1992). See also Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103. (Utah App. 
1999). 
"The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its 
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these 
changes support the modification made in the prior divorce decree 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted and only support the judgment." Muiv. at 739. The trial 
court 's findings in this case now on appeal are inadequate to support a 
modification of a decree, but even as it is the trial court 's failure to 
delineate why these changes support the modification is reversible error 
because the facts are not clear or uncontroverted and do not only 
support the judgment. 
Failure to enter detailed findings concerning child support 
determination constitutes an abuse of discretion. A lived v. A lived. 797 
P.2d 1108, 111 (Utah App. 1990). The improper application of the law to 
a situation is an abuse of discretion. Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The trial court order modifying the child support obligations of the 
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father should be vacated because (1) there was no substantial change 
in circumstances relating to the issue of child support, and (2) the 
cursory findings of the trial court were legally inadequate to 
support a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. 
2 day of December, 1999. 
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30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an order that 
established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both 
custodians have materially and substantially changed since the 
entry of the order to be modified, or the order has become 
unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
decree would be an improvement for and in the best interest of 
the child. 
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by 
order of the court if both parents file a motion for termination. 
At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal custody, 
the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under 
Section 30-3-10. All related issues, including visitation and 
child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is 
filed or answered frivolously and in a manner designed to harass 
the other party, the court shall assess attorney's fees as costs 
against the offending party. 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the 
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court 
for original appellate review and determination any matter over 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
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of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines - Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative 
order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered 
on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts 
resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of 
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record 
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best 
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut 
the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who 
live in the home of that parent and are not children in common to 
both parties may at the option of either party be taken into 
account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child 
support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute 
the obligations of the respective parents for the additional 
children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the 
appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the 
instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other than those in 
common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in 
the award but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the 
award. 
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or 
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal 
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the 
court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child, 
determine whether there is a difference between the amount 
ordered and the amount that would be required under the 
guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or more and the 
difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust 
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is 
not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b). 
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any 
time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support 
order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change 
in circumstances may include: 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of 
the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 3 0% or more in the income of a 
parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; 
and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of 
either parent for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the 
court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child, 
determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it has, 
the court shall then determine whether the change results in a 
difference of 15% or more between the amount of child support 
ordered and the amount that would be required under the 
guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is 
not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of 
child support ordered to that which is provided for in the 
guidelines. 
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order 
under Subsections (6) and (7) shall be included in each child 
support order issued or modified after July 1, 1997. 
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
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STEPHEN I. ODA, #2446 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
Nov Z5 I I 5s AH'36 
C L E R K , : * - , : : 37.COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT INB^AND FOR 
• C \ 1 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
TYLER DARAN BOYCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAMMY LINGE BOYCE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 9647 01453 DA 
This matter having come before the above entitled Court, and the Court 
having reviewed this matter, Plaintiffs Complaint, the parties' Stipulation and 
Agreement resolving all issues and the Affidavit in support of the Decree of 
Divorce and being fully advised hereby renders its decision in writing 
wherein a Decree is ordered to be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant; now by virtue of the law and the premises and in accordance 
with the facts found and Conclusions of Law aforesaid, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant be, and they are, hereby dissolved and 
the parties be, and they are, hereby restored to the status of unmarried 
persons, this Decree of Divorce becoming absolute and final upon entry. 
2. That each party be, and they are, hereby awarded the joint 
custody of the minor children, namely: CRYSTAL ANN BOYCE, born March 16, 
1990; CAMILLE T. BOYCE, born December 8, 1991; and SHANDI LIN BOYCE, born 
April 16, 1995, with joint physical custody with Defendant's home as the 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
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primary residence and granting Plaintiff equal control and input into the 
children's lives, and Plaintiff having liberal rights of visitation. 
3. That Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby required to pay Defendant, for 
the support of the minor children, the sum of $796.00 per month, a sum in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Schedule and each party's gross 
monthly income, plus 1/2 of any actually incurred day-care, expenses incurred 
by Defendant to maintain her employment. 
4. That obligor parent's income is subject to income withholding for 
payment of said child support obligation together with a processing fee of 
$7.00 per month, all in accordance with the Universal Income Withholding 
provisions 62A-11-501-504 Utah Code Annotated unless obligor's employer 
provides an allotment. 
5. No alimony should be awarded to either party as both are self-
sufficient. 
6. The Court, after taking all issues into consideration, does hereby 
order that Defendant be, and she is, hereby required to assume and pay the 
following debts, holding Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
a. First Security cash reserve and resulting interest $1,031.55 
b. Returned check for auto insurance (payable to Plaintiff -
$ 64.83) 
c. 37% of credit card debt owing Choice and Nations Credit 
card of $5,650.00 = $2,090.50 payable to Plaintiff 
d. Debt on 1994 Plymouth Acclaim auto 
e. All other bills relating to the Centerville home and 
property 
and that Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby required to assume and discharge the 
following debts, holding Defendant harmless therefrom: 
a. Balance of Choice Credit Card and Nations Credit 
card 
b. Counseling bill 
c. Debt on 1992 Oldsmobile Achieva 
d. All other bills relating to the Kaysville home and property 
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7. That Defendant be, and she is, hereby awarded the following 
property: 
a. 15-20 Home movies (to be recorded and returned to 
Tyler 
b. All statues 
c. Pair of white lamps 
d. 2 oak filing cabinets 
e. Nick-knack shelf and picture above it 
f. Personal effects and belongings 
g. 2 plants (not the silk tree or palm like plant) 
h. Cedar chest 
i. All holiday decorations including Christmas tree 
j . Blue storage bins 
k. Newest TV 
I. Newest VCR 
m. White and gold dressers w/matching desk and hutch 
n. New king-size bed 
o. 2/3 of kitchen cupboard contents 
p. 2/3 of food storage 
q. 2/3 of Tupperware and containers 
r. Wedding album and children's photo albums (Not to be 
disassembled and to remain available to Plaintiff to see 
or duplicate under Defendant's supervision) 
s. Scroll-saw 
t. Green/white dresser and 2 white folding chairs 
u. Piano 
v. Pair of pink chairs 
w. White couch 
x. Freezer 
y. Computer 
z. Sewing machine 
aa. Serger/sewer 
bb. New vacuum and yellow portable vacuum 
cc. Copy machine 
dd. Quilting frames 
ee. (2) heavy steel swing sets 
ff. Crib, high chair and stroller 
gg. Over 50 movies 
hh. New trampoline 
ii. Little Tykes playhouse, slide and table 
jj. Swinging park bench 
kk. Double shot basketball game 
II. Wood sander 
mm. Propane Bar-B-Que Grill 
n n . Ice Cream Maker 
oo. Metal filing cabinet 
pp. Locking wood cabinet 
qq. CD Player 
rr. Automatic bread maker 
ss. Mini bunk beds 
tt. Red lawn mower 
uu. Wedding china set 
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vv. Wheat grinder 
ww. Hand mixer 
xx. Electric fry pan 
yy. Crock pot 
and that Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby awarded the following property: 
a. All items not specifically awarded to Defendant 
b. All personal effects and belongings 
8. That each party will refrain from entering the respective 
properties of the other without the direct consent of the other. 
9. That Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby awarded the Kaysville 
residence located at 93 West 400 South, Kaysville, Utah. 
10. That Defendant be, and she is, hereby awarded the Centerville 
home located at 744 East 800 South, Centerville, Utah, in the process of 
completion. The home has a construction loan partially disbursed. Defendant 
shall complete the home and have complete and absolute control over the 
construction and loan draws. Defendant will finance the home upon 
completion without Plaintiffs name as an obligor. 
11. That Defendant's home in Centerville has equity exceeding the 
Kaysville home awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant be, and she is, hereby 
required to pay Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 to equalize equities. Said sum 
shall be payable upon the occurrence of one of the following: 
a. Remarriage of Defendant, payable within two (2) 
years of remarriage date 
b. Sale of the home 
c. The home is no longer Defendant's principal residence or 
d. The youngest child of the parties turns 18 or becomes 
emancipated. 
Defendant has the option to pay Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 in lieu of 
$10,000.00 equity payable forthwith upon signing of the Decree of Divorce. 
12. That each party shall maintain $50,000.00 minimum in life 
insurance during the minority of the children, naming the children as 
beneficiaries thereon. 
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13. That each party be, and they are, hereby required to provide 
health, accident and dental insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor 
children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in existence as 
of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's 
current or subsequent place of employment, Plaintiffs is to be primary 
insurance. Each party is ordered to pay for one-half of the premium for the 
insurance coverage of the children and one-half of any deductible or non-
covered amounts for such essential medical or dental services or prescriptions 
related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to provide 
other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to 
insure the prompt payment of the insured portion of such claims. 
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for 
orthodontia work or elective surgery for the children, or any type of 
psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating co-payment 
from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in 
writing. The non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say 
in the selection of doctors and procedures for any and all orthodontia, or 
surgery procedures, or psychological counseling, for which he or she is 
expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, 
and written consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie 
obligation to pay any non-insurance covered expense. 
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than 
emergency), medical, orthodontic or psychological counseling be done as a co-
obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the court. The party found 
to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees. 
For procedures not covered by insurance but reasonably within 
the parties' ability to pay and necessary to the welfare of the children, such as 
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orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then each party will 
normally be ordered to pay 1/2 of the costs associated with such treatments or 
procedures. 
When the other parent is expected to be responsible for 
deductible amounts attributable to medical or dental expenses incurred for the 
parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide copies of all 
receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any 
billing therefore incurred. Any claims not made to the other parent within 
that time frame in writing will be primae facie deemed waived. The other 
party is ordered to make their portion of those payments, or make 
arrangements to do so within 45 days of receipt of the documentation 
supporting required participation. 
14. That Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby allowed to claim the parties' 
oldest child and Defendant shall be allowed to claim the parties' youngest child 
with each party claiming the middle child in alternate years with Plaintiff 
claiming the odd years and Defendant claiming the even years. 
15. That each party be, and they are, hereby required to assume and 
pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
16. That each party be, and they are, hereby required to sign all 
deeds and documents necessary and proper to effect transfer of assets and/or 
obligations as provided herein. 
DATED this & . 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND 
CONTENT: 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DEC Zd 3 % AH 'S3 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (#3668) 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sessions Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)292-1818 
Fax: (801) 292-2525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
TYLER BOYCE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TAMMY L. GOBLE, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
ORDER OF MODIFICATION 
Civil No. 964701453DA 
Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
The Petitioner for Modification filed by Petitioner Tyler Boyce came before the Court for 
trial July 13, 1998 before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. Petitioner was present and 
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. Respondent was present and represented by counsel Terry 
Cathcart. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does 
enter the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
00 
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1. The parties will continue to share joint legal and physical custody of their three minor 
children. Petitioner is awarded the following specific visitation schedule with the minor children 
as follows: 
a. Alternate weekends from Friday until Monday morning; 
b. One midweek overnight each week on either Tuesday or Thursday; 
c. Alternate holidays in accordance with the Statewide Standard Schedule; 
d. One-half the summer which will include each party having two weeks uninterrupted 
time with the minor children and if the parties cannot agree on an alternate time 
hearing schedule for the summer they will each have two weeks in a row alternating 
through the summer. 
2. The above-referenced time sharing represents Petitioner having 37% of the nights and 
Respondent having 63% of the nights and these percentages will be used in a joint custody 
worksheet format to calculate child support. The Petitioner's income is $3,279 gross per month, the 
Respondent's income is zero. Based on the calculations, Petitioner will pay child support of $563.00 
per month to Respondent effective August 1, 1998. 
3. Upon Respondent obtaining employment she will immediately give notice to 
Petitioner so that the issue of child support can be reviewed. 
-2-
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DATED this <g&- day o f t ^ £ , , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) J«H 25 II 46 Ail *99 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON °' ' ;RT 
426 South 500 East ?• - P ^ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Facsimile: (801)575-7834 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TYLER BOYCE, j 
I ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, | RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL 
vs. J 
TAMMY L. GOBLE, j 
j Case No.: 964701453 DA 
I Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
Defendant. S 
ooOoo 
The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial came before the Court on 
April 20, 1999 before the Honorable Jon Memmott presiding. Plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by 
counsel Michael Nielsen. The Court heard argument, reviewed the record and file herein and 
made the following findings and ruling: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is denied. 
2. The Court finds that at the time of trial herein July 31, 1998 the Court heard 
evidence that the parties agreed in their original divorce stipulation to joint legal and joint 
physical custody of their minor children and liberal visitation. The Court found that since entry 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Decree there have been substantial, material changes in circumstances wherein the parties 
were unable to agree on a visitation schedule and that both parties filed petitions to modify 
stating that the joint custody terms of the Decree were unworkable. At trial, the Court found 
that the parties had resolved many disputes in mediation and through the temporary orders of 
the Court including having agreed to continue the joint legal and joint physical custody of their 
children and having agreed on a visitation schedule awarding to Plaintiff Tyler Boyce 37 % of 
the time with the children, and Defendant having 63 % of the time with the children. Based on 
the new visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, the Court deemed it appropriate that 
the parties use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate the amount of future child support. 
3. Further, at the time of trial, the Court learned through testimony that Mrs. Goble, 
the Defendant was not working full-time having previously been a school teacher and was 
currently staying home with the children. Based on that change, the Court sua sponte deemed 
it appropriate that zero income be imputed to Defendant for purposes of calculating child 
support. 
4. The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion for attorneys fees and finds that 
although Defendant did not really present evidence in her Motion which would have been 
considered in a new trial, that both parties reasonably incurred fees for the post-trial motions and 
each should bear their own costs and fees. 
DATED this Z 5 daffiof ^ J U L / V ^ , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approyaf^ as to Farm: 
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
D. Michael Nielsen 
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